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AIR

REF ID: A6673

24 October 1950

Chief of Station, Karlsruhe

Chief, FBI

Attn: [ ] [ ]

KIRITE Project

REFERENCE:

REF ID: A6673, 19513

1. Project KIRITE is approved for the period through 31 December 1951. A total of 3000 IM plus 60 APC is allocated to meet estimated expenses for the first half of the current fiscal year.

2. We are all too conscious of the fact that we have left the complete initiative in this project to you in the field, and that our comments on its progress and suggestions for further development have been sadly lacking. This has been due not to a lack of interest on the part of Headquarters, but to the slowness of development of general thinking on the entire problem of step-behind activities. As we have indicated in letters to [ ] [ ] the fact that we do not believe a general outbreak of hostilities to be imminent does not lessen our responsibility to make as adequate preparations for an eventual conflict as our other more current commitments permit. In specific regard to KIRITE, we believe that prior to further recruitment, we should reexamine the assets we now have in the light of their usefulness should there be a general outbreak of hostilities. While your progress reports have been useful, there are still many questions which arise on a detailed review of the KIRITE file. In general, it is unclear here as to the extent the various masters of KIRITE are aware of their proposed use and as to what plans, if any, have been made for their activation in the event of an emergency. Our comments on the individual KIRITE masters follow.

3. KIRITE 1: We note that he is not suited for cover training, but also fail to see that he has any special qualifications to classify him as a "step-behind informant". What is his present overt employment and what type of information could he be trained to supply? The assessment given in REF ID: A6673 leads us to believe that perhaps he could best be utilized in KIRITE as a contact and possibly as the cipher man in a not consulting role of T/T operator and informant(s). Has he taken any action to join Communist-front organizations in line

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EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

(2)(A) Privacy [ ]

(2)(B) Methods/Sources [X]

(2)(G) Foreign Relations [ ]

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with his own suggestion or is he still politically inactive? Has his Russian girl-friend emigrated to the States and what change, if any, has occurred in his personal status which might affect his willingness or ability to stay-behind on our behalf?

KIRITZ 2: The exact role he would be able to play as a leader of a stay-behind unit is questionable. We assume that KIRITZ 4 would take direction from him, and that KIRITZ 4 might serve as a contact or informant, but does he have potential contacts who could provide information of value or is it proposed that he be tied-in with other stay-behind agents? The work he has done as a recruiter increases the security hazard inherent in stay-behind activities -- we must balance his own value as a stay-behind agent against the potential harm he could cause through compromise of other stay-behind agents. The residual effects of the [ ] project are unclear, and in general we know too little of his activities since September 1949 to approve his receiving communications training at this stage.

KIRITZ 3: We agree that he appears to be a good bet for training as a radio operator, and shall be interested in his progress. What is his present employment and is he aware of our plans for him? Once his training has been accomplished, it may be feasible to work out some plan whereby he will service an agent or group who may not be presently associated with the KIRITZ project.

KIRITZ 4: His past military service, while increasing his value as an observer and informant in the event of hostilities, probably would limit his usefulness to the initial combat phase unless plans could be worked out for him to go underground. Is he still employed by the sporting-goods firm? Has KIRITZ 2 given him any indication of the part he would be expected to play in event of a Soviet occupation of Germany?

KIRITZ 5: His record of employment by the American authorities (particularly his present job for CIA) would be a definite handicap to his long range use. Otherwise, he seems to be a natural for communications training. Has he moved away from KIRITZ 2, or is it now planned to retain him in the latter's unit?

KIRITZ 6: His activities as president of the Student Union, his record as a PW in the States, his mother's social connections in England, and his apparent availability for conscription in the event of war lead us to question his long range usefulness.

KIRITZ 7: We are uncertain whether his war-time injuries would eliminate him from immediate conscription. In any event, he seems to be one of our best prospects for use as a W/T operator.

KIRITZ 8: His experience while with the CDU in Leipzig is an adverse factor as regards his stayability. We assume that, rather than giving him communications training, you are considering him as a recruiter and possible leader of a stay-behind unit.

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4. As you will have gathered from our comments in the preceding paragraphs, we have concluded that the main emphasis in the KILLZ program should be placed on the development of stay-behind units for use in the event of hostilities, rather than in the event of a possible withdrawal of our forces from Germany. This consideration should be given to supplying selected stay-behind agents with false documentation when needed, to equipping of radio sets and supplies for their eventual use, and to the assignment of cipher, signal plane and cryptos which can be made readily available to them in an emergency. This means that a realistic and continuous assessment of the capabilities of each candidate is required and obviously it is important that we have all available personnel, as well as full reports on the development of each candidate, for this reason, we ask that you take careful stock of your present candidates and give us your recommendations prior to further intensive recruiting. As to future recruiting, we believe some arrangements may be possible for giving access to women on an individual basis - our understanding is that a session at HIRSHOHN would not be essential. A word of warning is perhaps appropriate insofar as recruitment of former German Army and Luftwaffe officers is concerned - we do not want to cross lines with KILLZ.

KILLZ 11: Let us know if you consider it worthwhile to have the unit in the event of hostilities. We agree he appears to be a good third, and that the activities should be limited to recruiting for the initial combat phase.

KILLZ 12: Cover by separate group.

KILLZ 12: He appears to have good possibilities as a cover for stay-behind activities. Also from his own Russian PR status, our proposed concern to whether his wife, or anyone else, has been taken into his confidence. If you can provide the name and address of his brother in the States, and contact it worthwhile, we will arrange to have the interviewed regarding KILLZ 12.

KILLZ 12: Please advise whether any of the traces given in KILLZ-5227 are identical with this man. On the basis of the available facts, we agree that he is a hard-boiled character who should prove useful in the event of hostilities. He would be interested in a little on his activities while hiding in the Russian zone - frankly, we are somewhat skeptical about his loyalty to the Americans more than the Russians.

KILLZ 10: As an ex-German Army combat specialist, his usefulness must be presumed limited to the initial phase unless a plan can be devised for him to go underground.

KILLZ 9: Even though he was apparently unharmed politically by his stay in Russia (KILLZ-28361), as an ex Reichsmacht radio man, his stayability is questionable.

KILLZ 9: His current overt employment presumably would make him suspect in the event of a Soviet occupation.

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5. As we stated in WASH 18003, future requests for approval of commo training should be specific in spelling out what type of training is planned for each individual. This will enable us to obtain more quickly the necessary joint approval with Commo.

6. The time, thought, and effort that have been devoted to the KIMITEZ project are fully appreciated here, and we shall do our best to give you prompter and more constructive service from this end. Your proposed survey of drop areas would be a valuable addition to our overall planning, but for the present we suggest you concentrate on the coordination of your current assets so that at least one unit may be completely ready for activation by the first of the year.

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	Residence	Date + how recruited	Present Status	Qualifications & Comments
1	Munich	Thru Canakin - June 1949	stay-behind informer	Not suited for Commo. Present job? Any training?
2	Esslingen	News ad - Jan. 49 Plain contact - June 49	leader of stay-behind net - Recruiter	Not trained Commo due to physical big Kibitz 4 & 5 in leg unit, stated father "missing in Russia".
3	Stuttgart	Plains as social worker - Feb. 49	S. b. Commo manually - no time for training	Good English, typist present job? Phys. handicapped - alerted to S. b.
4	Esslingen	Kibitz 2 - June 49	Ant. ant. informant?? "strong-man"	German capt. mt. troops - unaware
5	Esslingen	Kibitz 2 - Summer 49	Previous commo - no current training	Shell plake in head, good wal. - employed at Kibitz 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100
6	Tubingen	Kibitz 2, Plains - June 1949	Some Commo training, incl. cipher	Charmist student at Tubingen - mother visiting friends in England - supported her overly.
7		Feb. 1948	To be given Commo training	Needs support, Univ. student
8	Wilsbad/Pforzheim	C J PRA - Oct. 49	To build unit - Commo training??	Commercial instructor born 1900, U-b. helping CoU arrested by MVD, Hermann Taberner
9	Oberrayen	C J PRA Oct. 49		manages America House, Telegraphs, engine
9A	Refugee camp New Ulm	Recruited by HQ PRA Jan. 50		Russian POW - Released Summer '49 Former German army Commo man
10	Oberrayen	Flock - PRA Oct. 49	Completed basic training Jan. '50	Has proposed 2 candidates, Indep. Commo, Rep, German intercept man,
11	Wernsberg/Kaiserslautern	C J PRA Oct. 49	Info gathering, safe haven - to take comms	To assist in building up unit, Knows of 50% disabled - manages Kibitz Co, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100
11A	Sondheim bei Hamburg	Kibitz 11 - PRA March 50		Hit in Russia when US troops entered, War Criminal Right hand lost, SS Sgt, carpenter
12		C J Dec. 49	Info gathering & safe house.	Amputated left leg Owner of hunting lodge - very anti-Commo
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14	Stuttgart	Thru C J '50 - Recruit - contact	Recruiter - bidding	Former German Army Commo captain - has own radio repair shop

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